Abstract. Following Ajtai's lead, Ajtai and Dwork have recently introduced a public-key encryption scheme which is secure under the assumption that a certain computational problem on lattices is hard on the worst-case. Their encryption method may cause decryption errors, though with small probability (i.e., inversely proportional to the security parameter). In this paper we modify the encryption method of Ajtai and Dwork so that the legitimate receiver always recovers the message sent. That is, we make the Ajtai-Dwork Cryptosystem error-free.
Introduction
A major project of our eld is to nd concrete hard problems which can be used for \doing Cryptography" (e.g., constructing encryption schemes, messageauthentication codes and digital signatures). As current state of the art in Complexity Theory does not allow to prove that such (cryptographically-useful) problems are hard, one has to rely on unproven and yet plausible assumptions. It is thus important to have as many alternative/unrelated assumption as possible, so that Cryptography can be based on any one of them. So far there are very few alternatives; and so Ajtai's work 1], which suggests a new domain out of which adequately-hard problems can be found, marks an important day for Cryptography.
In particular, Ajtai constructed a one-way function based on the assumption that Lattice Reduction is hard in the worst-case. Following his lead, Ajtai and Dwork have recently introduced a public-key encryption scheme which is secure, provided that the following (worst-case complexity) assumption holds 2]:
Assumption ISVP (Infeasibility of Shortest Vector Problem): There exists no polynomial-time algorithm, which given an arbitrary basis for an n-dimensional lattice, having a \unique poly(n)-shortest vector", nds the shortest (non-zero) vector in the lattice. By having a unique poly(n)-shortest vector we mean that any vector of length at most poly(n) times bigger than the shortest vector is an integer multiple of the shortest vector.
The encryption method of Ajtai and Dwork 2], has a non-zero decryptionerror probability. Speci cally, when working with security parameter n, the ciphertext of the message bit`1' is decrypted to be a`0' with probability 1 n . (The ciphertext corresponding to the message bit`0' is always decrypted as`0'.)
In this paper we modify the encryption method of Ajtai and Dwork so that every message is always decrypted correctly. Thus, we obtain a error-free encryption scheme which is secure under the same assumption used by Ajtai and Dwork.
The Encryption Scheme
In this section we recall the construction of Ajtai and Dwork 2] and describe our modi cation of it. We start by introducing a few notations which are used throughout the paper.
Notations
We denote the set of integers by Z, and the set of real numbers by R. For any number between 0 and 1 2 , we denote by Z the set of real numbers for which the distance to the nearest integer is at most .
The n-dimensional Euclidean space is denoted by R n . For two vectors x; y 2 R n , we denote the inner-product of x and y by hx; yi. Given a set of n linearly independent vectors w 1 ; : : :; w n 2 R n , the parallelepiped which is spanned by the The width of P(w 1 ; : : :; w n ) is the minimum over i of the Euclidean distance between w i and the subspace spanned by the other w j 's.
Given a parallelepiped P = P(w 1 ; : : :; w n ) and a vector v, we reduce v modulo P by obtaining a vector v 0 2 P so that v 0 = v + P i c i w i , where the c i are all integers. We denote this process by v 0 = v mod P.
The Ajtai-Dwork Construction
Let us recall the Ajtai-Dwork construction. 3 To simplifythe exposition we present the scheme in terms of real numbers, but we always mean numbers with some xed nite precision. (Following 2] , one should use n-bit binary expansion of real numbers when working with security parameter n). 3 The scheme which we describe below is slightly di erent than the original scheme in 2]. The di erence between these schemes is insigni cant, however (this is mostly a matter of presentation style).
Common Parameters. Given security parameter n, we let m def = n 3 , and n def = 2 n log n . We denote by B n (for Big or cuBe) the n-dimensional cube of sidelength n . Also, we denote by S n (for Small or Sphere) the n-dimensional sphere of radius n ?8 . Namely, we have B n def = fx 2 R n : 0 x i < n ; i = 1; : : :; ng and S n def = fx 2 R n : kxk n ?8 g Private-key. Given security parameter n, the private-key is a uniformly chosen vector in the n-dimensional unit sphere. We denote this vector by u.
Public-key. For a private key u, denote by H u the distribution on points in B n which is induced by the following process.
1. Pick a point a uniformly at random from the set fx 2 B n : hx; ui 2 Zg.
2. For i = 1; : : :; n, select 1 ; : : :; n uniformly at random from S n . 3. Output the point v = a + P i i . Using this notation, the public key which correspond to the private key u is obtained by picking the points w 1 ; : : :; w n ; v 1 ; : : :; v m independently at random from the distribution H u , subject to the constraint that the width of the parallelepiped P(w 1 ; : : :; w n ) is at least n ?2 n . In the sequel, we often use the To encrypt a '1' we uniformly select a vector x in the parallelepiped P(w). This vector is the ciphertext which correspond to the bit '1'.
Decryption. Given a ciphertext, x, and the private-key u, we compute = hx; ui.
We decrypt the ciphertext as a '0' if is within 1=n of some integer and decrypt it as a '1' otherwise.
Decryption errors. It is easy to see that if x is an encryption of '1', then the fractional part of hx; ui is distributed almost uniformly in 0; 1). On the other hand, a simple argument show that if x is an encryption of '0' then the fractional part of hx; ui is always less than 1=n in absolute value. Thus, an encryption of '0' will always be decrypted as '0', and an encryption of '1' has a probability of 2=n to be decrypted as '0'.
An Error-free Construction
We proceed now to describe our modi cation which eliminates the decryption errors from the construction above. In this modi ed scheme, just like in the original Ajtai-Dwork scheme, encrypting a '0' results in a ciphertext x such that hx; ui is close to an integer. However, in our scheme we also make sure that encrypting a '1' results in a ciphertext x such that hx; ui is far from any integer.
The modi ed scheme is as follows:
Common Parameters and private-key. The commonparameters n; m; n ; B n and S n , and the private key u, are set in exactly the same manner as in the original scheme.
Public-key (modi ed). The vectors w 1 ; : : :; w n ; v 1 ; : : :; v m are chosen in exactly the same manner as in the original scheme.
In addition, we pick i 1 uniformly at random from all the indices i for which ha i ; ui 2 2Z + 1, where a i is the large vector used to generate v i (i.e., v i = a i + P j j ). That is, i 1 is selected so that ha i1 ; ui is an odd integer. We note that with probability 1 ? 2 ? (m) such an index exists. Note that this theorem establishes the security (as de ned in 3]) of the encryption scheme of Ajtai and Dwork 2], since in that scheme = 1 is encrypted as a uniformly chosen point in P(w). To establish the security of our (modi ed) encryption scheme (under the same assumption), we need to prove . For a bit 2 f0; 1g, and an encryption key (e; i), let us denote by E e;i ( ) the probabilistic encryption of using (e; i). Also, let us denote by w the uniform distribution over P(w). Assuming ISVP, we will show that for both = 0 and = 1, it is infeasible to distinguish (e; i; E e;i ( )) from (e; i; w ). First we show that this holds for = 0. Note that this claim is not identical to Theorem 2, as here the distinguisher is given i (for which hv i ; ui 2 2Z+1 n ?7 holds) as extra information. Still, Theorem 2 does imply the following Lemma 4 Under Assumption ISVP, it is infeasible to distinguish (e; i; E e;i (0)) from (e; i; w ), where (e; i) are selected as above and w is uniformly distributed in P(w). Proof. Suppose towards the contradiction that there exists a distinguisher, D, of running-time t(n) and distinguishing gap (n) (between (e; i; E e;i (0)) and (e; i; w ) as in the claim). We construct a new distinguisher, D 0 , which violates Theorem 2. D 0 works as follows:
input: e = (w 1 ; : : :; w n ; v 1 ; : : :; v m ) and x. preprocessing: Using D, we nd an index j which approximately maximizes the distinguishing gap of D on inputs of the form (e; j; ). This is done by estimating, for every j = 1; : : :; m, the value Prob D(e; j; E e;j (0)) = 1] ? Prob D(e; j; w ) = 1] where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of both the encryption algorithm (i.e., choice of b i 's) and D. Invoking D for poly(n)= (n) decision: Using j and , found in the preprocessing, we invoke D on input (e; j; x). Let 2 f 1g denote the output of D. Then D 0 outputs .
Clearly, D 0 has running time poly(n; t(n); (n) ?1 ), which is polynomial in n as long as t(n)= (n) is polynomial in n. One can easily verify the argument in 2] holds also for distinguishers of encryptions under our modi ed scheme. Speci cally, one needs to verify that when applying our encryption scheme using m uniformly distributed vectors, the result is distributed almost uniformly in the parallelepiped P(w), regardless of whether a`0' or a`1' was encrypted. u t
